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Abstract
A cost-reducing process innovation protected by a patent is sold to one
of several …rms engaged in price competition. There is incomplete infor-
mation about production costs. Our main result is that standard auction
mechanisms do not allocate the innovation e¢ciently. The ine¢ciency re-
sults extends to patent races frameworks. An auction where the lowest
bidder gets the patent is shown to be e¢cient.
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In a classical paper, Arrow (1962) de…ned the value of a patent on a cost-reducing
innovation as the revenue which the innovator could achieve by licensing the in-
novation to producing …rms. Arrow also pointed out that the value depends on
the downstream market structure. There is by now an extensive literature on
patent races, patent licensing and the value of patents. This literature is surveyed
in Tirole (1988), Reinganum (1989) and Kamien (1992). In particular, Kamien’s
survey compares licensing procedures in various oligopolistic market structures.
An important feature of most of the relevant papers is the fact that information
is complete: all relevant parameters (e.g., production costs before and after an
innovation is introduced) and hence downstream pro…ts are common knowledge.
Our main goal is to investigate the e¤ects of incomplete information1 in a
simple model of patent auctions conducted in an oligopolistic industry where
…rms compete in prices. We will show that this feature drastically changes the
conclusions we obtain in the same model under complete information.
We consider several …rms engaged in price competition under conditions of
asymmetric information about production costs: this will be the ”status-quo”
situation. An innovation, which is sold through an auction, enables a reduction
in marginal cost. The main questions we address are: Which …rm will acquire
the patent ? Is the allocation e¢cient ? What is the revenue to the seller of the
patent, i.e., what is the ”value” of the patent ?
The above questions are often addressed in industry studies. We now brie‡y
describe two cases which di¤er with respect to the information available to the
competing …rms.
1Kamien (1992) concludes his survey with the following: ”Obviously much remains to be
done in bringing the models of patent licensing closer to reality. For example, introducing
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the cost reduction provided by an invention....”
21) Competitors in the mature steel industry know each other well, and en-
gineers often visit competitors’ plants ( see Ghemawat, 1997, and von Hippel,
1988). In 1983 a West-German company called SMS discovered a new process
that enabled thinner casting of ‡at-rolled steel sheets2. Nucor of Charlotte, NC
(who was a minion at the time) adopted the new technology in 1987. It was the
…rst …rm to do so in the U.S., and till 1995 it faced no competitors using that
technology3. Ghemawat thinks that Nucor’s …rst adoption of the new technology
(instead of adoption by one of the large integrated mills) ”appears anomalous”.
He writes: ”Why was Nucor, rather than other competitors, the one that adopted
…rst ?...”The most obvious reason for Nucor’s adoption of thin-slab casting before
other mills is that it seems to have been more e¢cient than the average.”
2) Stobaugh (1988) reviews innovation patterns in the petrochemical industry,
and focuses on nine main compounds used in …bers, plastics and rubbers. A key
factor for innovation is the amount of capital available for research. There are
many and frequent process innovations - Stobaugh calculates an average of one
innovation every two years for each one of the nine compounds, up to 1974.4 An
important feature of the industry is its secrecy: petrochemical …rms go to great
length to keep proprietary information from leaking to competitors5.
2All main process innovations in the steel industry were concerned with thinner casting.
3Subsequently Nucor became one of the largest US steel makers.
4About 30% of all innovations involve radically new raw materials or operational steps.
For example, acrylonitrile was …rst commercialized by BASF in 1933. Standard Oil of Ohio
introduced a radically new production process in 1960, cut prices from 26 to 18 cents per pound,
and caused widespread shutdown of existing plants. Its subsequent pro…ts were estimated at
$700 million.
5For example, Union Carbide had a policy of not even …lling process patents in an attempt
to keep operations secret. Units were called by code names (a practice also used at Monsanto),
and non-technical personnel did not even know what product was produced where, and under
which conditions.
3One of Stobaugh main …ndings is the discrepancy between product and process
innovations concerning innovators’ identities. Product innovators were almost
always among the largest …rms in the industry6: the innovating …rm had, on
average, 75% of the size of the largest …rm in the speci…c line of business. On
the contrary, …rms of various sizes have participated in process innovation. The
corresponding averages are 60% for early process innovators, 25% for late process
innovators and 10% for technology purchasers7. Most telling, only four out of the
nine studied product innovators (which initially monopolized the market for an
average period of 5.7 years) still manufacture the respective product, and none is
a world leader. The reason seems to be that only one of the product innovators
developed a new process for the product it originally commercialized. As we will
see this pattern agrees well with our funding below.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model with
complete information, and we show that the …rm with the ex-ante lowest cost
(i.e., the ex-ante most e¢cient …rm) attaches the highest value to the patent,
and consequently bids highest for it at standard auctions. In particular, standard
auction mechanisms such as the second-price and …rst-price sealed-bid auctions
are e¢cient.
In Section 3 we introduce incomplete information: we assume that the ex-
ante production costs are private information, while the percentage reduction in
marginal cost due to the innovation is common knowledge8. This yields a model
with interdependent values. In Subsection 3.1 we show that standard auctions
6Stobaugh compares the list of product innovators with the ”Who’s Who” of the petrochem-
ical industry.
7Interestingly, technology sellers in the industry succeed to reap up to 75% of the estimated
savings for the purchaser.
8For example, imagine a new device that performs twice as fast as older models.
4which award the patent to the highest bidder are not e¢cient9: in any equilibrium
of such an auction there will be instances where the patent is not bought by the
…rm with ex-ante lowest cost, contradicting the e¢ciency criterion for the complete
information case. We compute ine¢cient equilibria for the simpler case where the
post-innovation cost is equal for all …rms. These equilibria usually involve pooling.
In Subection 3.2 we construct an e¢cient auction. Interestingly, such an auction
awards the patent to the lowest bidder! In Subsection 3.3 we brie‡y discuss
R&D races for patents. In Section 4 we gather several concluding comments. In
particular, we address a possible application of our model to takeover contests.
2. Licensing under complete information
Consider …rst a Bertrand duopoly in a market with inelastic demand, normalized
to be equal to one unit. There are 2 …rms producing a homogenous good. Firm i
produces with constant marginal cost ci: The …rms simultaneously choose prices
p1 and p2: Sales for …rm i are given by
xi(pi;p j)=
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
1; if pi <p j
1
2; if pi = pj
0,i fpi >p j
and pro…ts are given by
¼i(pi;p j)=xi(pi;p j)(pi ¡ ci):
Assume now that an inventor uses an auction10 to sell a cost-reducing tech-
nical innovation protected by a patent. We assume that only one …rm will be
9Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) discuss various types of ine¢ciencies arising for any allocation
procedure if signals are multidimensional. In the present model signals are one-dimensional, and
e¢cient allocation procedures do exist (see below).
10We focus here on standard …rst- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. Other mechanisms
such as the Dutch or English auctions yield here the same results.
5licensed11. The technical innovation allows …rm i to produce with a marginal cost
of min(ci;®c i + c); where 0 · ® · 1; and c<min(c1;c 2). The main questions
of interest are: Which …rm will buy the patent, and which price it will pay, i.e.,
what is the ”value” of the patent ?
De…nition 2.1. The value of the patent for a …rm is the di¤erence between the
pro…t it makes in case it acquires the patent, and the pro…t in case it does not. An
a u c t i o ni ss a i dt ob ee¢cient if it awards the patent to the …rm with the highest
value.
Proposition 2.2. The …rm with the ex-ante lowest cost attaches the highest
value to the patent and obtains it at a standard auction.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that c2 <c 1: We o¤er here the proof
for the case where ®<c2¡c
c1 ; so that both …rms attach a positive value to the
patent. In the other case …rm 1 attaches a zero value to the patent, and the proof
is simpler.
The losing …rm always makes zero pro…ts. If …rm 1 gets the patent, then it
competes with cost ®c1 +c against …rm 2 that has cost c2 >® c 1 +c: This implies
that …rm 1 will serve the market by charging a price p1 which is slightly lower than
c2
12. Hence, the value of the patent for …rm 1 is simply c2¡®c1¡c: Similarly, the
value of the patent for …rm 2 is given by c1¡®c2¡c: Since c1¡®c2¡c>c 2¡®c1¡c,
…rm 2 (i.e., the …rm with ex-ante lower costs) attaches a higher value to winning,
11This is, in fact, optimal for an inventor facing Bertrand competitors (see Kamien, 1992).
12Asymmetric Bertrand games (and …rst-price auctions) have no equilibria in pure strategies
here, but introducing a smallest money unit immediately yields the intuitive solution. Other
modeling approaches use sharing rules for the case where both …rms charge the same price.
For example, Lederer and Hurter (1986)use a ”lowest cost” sharing rule that could be applied
here. This technical problem usually disappears under conditions of incomplete information
with continuous types.
6and it will consequently win the patent by biding c2 ¡ ®c1 ¡ c in a sealed-bid
…rst-price auction or c1 ¡ ®c2 ¡ c in a sealed-bid second-price auction13.I nb o t h
cases, the revenue to the seller is equal to c2 ¡ ®c1 ¡ c: Q.E.D.
It is straightforward to show that Proposition 2.2 generalizes to the case of
more than 2 bidders: the …rm that stands to gain most from acquiring the patent
is always the …rm that will face in the post-innovation world the least e¢cient
best competitor. Thus, the …rm that bids most is the ex-ante most e¢cient …rm,
a n dw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
Corollary 2.3. Under complete information, standard auctions are e¢cient.
Remark 1. An explanation about the use of the term e¢ciency is necessary:
since consumers do not participate at the auction, the …rst natural step is to
judge the allocation procedure according to its properties for the involved agents
(…rms and patent holder). Of course, a procedure that creates high value for those
agents may be less desirable for consumers. To see this, consider again the set-up
of Proposition 2.2: if c2 <c 1; the innovation does not a¤ect the market price,
which remains …xed at c1: But consumers prefer the alternative where the less
e¢cient …rm 1 gets the patent, in which case the price goes down to c2: In our
model demand is inelastic. Assuming that consumers value the product at v; the
price is a linear transfer from consumers to …rms, and it is immediate to see that
awarding the patent to the ex-ante most e¢cient …rm also maximizes total welfare.
In an extended model with elastic demand, total welfare must take into account a
weighted sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses, and the welfare properties
of allocation procedures will generally depend on the respective weights. In any
case, an allocation procedure that awards the patent to an arbitrary …rm (as it is
the case in the pooling equilibria displayed below) cannot maximize total welfare.
13The arguments for English or Dutch auctions are completely analogous.
73. Licensing under incomplete information
We now allow for incomplete information about ex-ante production costs. While
the complete-information treatment …ts well mature industries, the framework
below is better suited for emerging or very dynamic and secretive industries where
there is still considerable uncertainty about competitors. In this context, we show
that e¢ciency-based explanations o¤er no indication about the identity of the
…rm which is likely to acquire the innovation.
The model is as follows: There are n …rms competing in a Bertrand oligopoly.
Firm i0s marginal cost in the status-quo, ci ,i sprivate information to that …rm.
All …rms j; j 6= i; believe that ci i sd i s t r i b u t e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[cL;c H] according
with density f>0; independently of other costs.
A cost-reducing technical innovation allows production with marginal cost of
min (ci;®c i + c);where; 0 · ® · 1 and c<c L are common-knowledge. An inde-
pendent inventor uses an auction to sell the innovation to one of the …rms. Note
that the value of the patent for …rm i d e p e n d sb o t ho ni t so w ne x - a n t em a r g i n a l
cost (through the term ®ci) and on the ex-ante cost of the most e¢cient competi-
tor among those that did not get the patent (this cost is not known to i at the
time of the auction). Hence, our model displays interdependent values.I no r d e rt o
avoid signalling issues, we look at the case where the true production costs of the
bidding …rms are revealed after the auction, i.e., the posterior Bertrand game is
conducted under complete information. It is known that signalling through bids
in order to ”manipulate” competitors’ beliefs in a downstream interaction game
may cause ine¢ciencies (see Das Varma (2000) and Goeree (2000)14).
14Das Varma studies a private values model where the ex-ante costs are common-knowledge
and equal (hence the …rms are symmetric). If …rm i;i =1 ;2 wins the patent, it produces
with cost c ¡ µi; where µi is private information. Goeree studies an auction setting where the
downstream interaction is modeled in reduced form, expanding on Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996,
83.1. Ine¢ciency in standard auctions
In many basic auction settings the e¢ciency properties that hold for auction
procedures under complete information continue to hold under incomplete infor-
mation, at least as long as the bidders are ex-ante symmetric15 (see Myerson, 1981
or Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Our model is ex-ante symmetric, and, given the
result for the complete information case, the e¢ciency of standard auctions seems
intuitive. Two conditions must be ful…lled in order to obtain equilibrium e¢ciency
(i.e., a patent award to the ex-ante most e¢cient …rm) for any realization of …rms’
marginal costs16:
1. The equilibrium strategies must be symmetric.
2. The equilibrium strategies must be strictly monotone decreasing in cost.
The following result shows that the second-price auction does not possess an
equilibrium with the above properties. The proofs for other standard auctions
(e.g., …rst-price, all-pay, English, Dutch, etc...) are completely analogous and
uses the respective …rst-order conditions.
Proposition 3.1. The second-price auction is not e¢cient.
2000)
15Ex-ante symmetry requires here that all …rms have the same utility function, and all costs
are drawn from the same distribution. It is well-known that ex-ante asymmetries lead to ine¢-
ciencies (see Myerson, 1981).
16Note also that any two procedures that yields the same physical allocation are, up to a
constant revenue-equivalent. Revenue equivalence is well-known in settings with private values
(i.e., in situations where the valuation of one agent does not depend on information available to
other agents). Our model has interdependent values, but revenue equivalence continues to hold
as long as types are independent (for a formal result, see for example Fieseler, Kittsteiner and
Moldovanu, 2000)
9Proof. Assume that ®<cL¡c
cH , so that the winning …rm is sure to have the
lowest cost. Assume that a symmetric equilibrium in strictly monotone decreasing
strategies exists, and denote the common bidding function by b17:
Assume that …rm i with cost ci bids x: The maximization problem for …rm i
reads:
max
x
Z cH
b¡1(x)
((cj ¡ ®ci ¡ c) ¡ b(cj))(n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(cj))
n¡2f(cj)dcj
where b¡1denotes the inverse function of b: The …rst order condition is:
¡(b
¡1)
0(x)(n ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(b
¡1(x))
n¡2f(b
¡1(x))
³
b
¡1(x) ¡ ®ci ¡ c ¡ b(b
¡1(x)
´
=0 :
Since in a symmetric equilibrium we must have x = b(ci); the unique solution to
the above equation is b(ci)=( 1¡®)ci¡c: Observe that the candidate equilibrium
bidding function (1 ¡ ®)ci ¡ c is strictly monotonic increasing, and this is a
contradiction to our assumption. Therefore, the second-price auction does not
have a symmetric equilibrium in strictly monotonic decreasing strategies, and
thus it cannot be e¢cient. Q.E.D.
Since standard auctions (or other similarly structured methods where the high-
est bidder wins) are nevertheless likely to be employed in practice, it is of interest
to compute their equilibria. The task is complex since one must guess how an
equilibrium may look like. We display below ine¢cient equilibria for the sim-
pler model where ® =0 ; i.e., the ex-ante costs are private information, but the
winner’s post-innovation cost is given by the constant c.
Under the assumption that a separating symmetric equilibrium exists in the
second-price auction, we have shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1 that the
only candidate equilibrium function is bi(ci)=( 1¡ ®)ci ¡ c ,w h i c hb e c o m e s
bi(ci)=ci ¡ c for ® =0 :
17Note that any strictly monotone function is di¤erentiable almost everywhere. In order to
shorten the argument we assume below that b is di¤erentiable everywhere.
10Proposition 3.2. The strategy pro…le where each …rm bids according to bi(ci)=
ci ¡c constitutes an equilibrium of the second-price auction18 only for the case of
two bidders19.
Proof. For a given realization of cost parameters, let i¤ =a r gm a x i ci: Assume
that all …rms i 6= i¤; bid according to bi(ci)=ci¡c: By bidding b = ci¤ ¡c; …rm i¤
wins the patent and pays maxi6=i¤ ci ¡c. In the subsequent Bertrand competition
this …rm makes a pro…t of mini6=i¤ ci ¡ c . Hence the overall payo¤ for i¤ is given
by (mini6=i¤ ci ¡ c) ¡ (maxi6=i¤ ci ¡ c)=m i n i6=i¤ ci ¡ maxi6=i¤ ci: It is clear that,
for n>2; the last term is negative for almost all realizations. Hence, a bid
b =0is more advantageous for i¤ than the bid b = ci¤ ¡ c: For n =2we have
mini6=i¤ ci¡maxi6=i¤ ci =0 ; hence …rm i¤ is indi¤erent between winning and loosing
and the bid ci¤ ¡ c is optimal. It is easy then to see that the proposed strategy
pro…le is optimal also if a …rm has the higher cost. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the strategy pro…le where 8i; bi(ci)=b¤ = E[minj6=i cj¡
c]: This strategy pro…le constitutes an equilibrium20 for both a …rst-price and a
second-price auction. For n>2; this is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that all …rms i;i 6= i¤; use this strategy. If …rm i¤ bids b¤; then
its overall expected payo¤ is 1
n(E[minj6=i cj ¡c]¡b¤)=0 : Bidding b<b ¤ yields a
18For n =2 , we can easily use revenue equivalence in order to compute an ine¢cient separating
equilibrium for the …rst-price sealed-bid auction: bi(ci)=E[c¡i ¡ c j c¡i · ci];i=1 ;2 ,w h e r e
¡i is the …rm other than i ,a n dw h e r eE denotes the expectation according to f:
19This construction works also for the case where cL · c · cH . The strategy pro…le b =
(b1(c1);b 2(c2)) where 8i;i =1 ;2;b i(ci)=ci ¡ c for ci ¸ c; and bi(ci)=0for ci <c,i sa n
(ine¢cient) equilibrium
20Since ties appear in equilibrium with positive probability (in fact with probability 1), we
assume below that each of the tied winners gets the patent with the same probability.
11zero expected payo¤, while bidding b>b ¤ yields E[minj6=i cj ¡ c] ¡ b<0: Hence
ab i do fb¤ is optimal.
Pooling cannot be sustained at a level e b 6= b¤ since: 1) If e b>b ¤; the …rms make
negative pro…ts and prefer to bid zero; 2) If e b<b ¤;each …rm makes an expected
pro…t of 1
n(E[minj6=icj ¡c]¡e b)= 1
n(b¤ ¡e b) > 0;a n de a c h… r mh a sa ni n c e n t i v et o
always win the patent by bidding slightly higher.
The proof that for n>2 a symmetric equilibrium cannot have strictly mono-
tone intervals follows by combining arguments similar to those in Propositions 3.1
and 3.2. Q.E.D.
T os u m m a r i z e ,t h em a i nc o n c l u s i o no ft h i ss e c t i o ni st h a t ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
incomplete information, it is hard to make a determinate prediction about the
identity of the …rm that will acquire an innovation through standard auctions.
E¢ciency based explanations loose their predictive power. Recall here Stobaugh’s
…ndings about the petrochemical industry. The large variance of the types of …rms
that participated in process innovation seems to …t well with our above results:
when costs are private information, pooling equilibria may prevail, and the identity
of the innovator cannot be a-priori determined.
3.2. An e¢cient auction
The above results reveal that standard auctions will generally not award the patent
to the …rm that values it most. Is there any mechanism that achieves this goal ?
We have the following, rather intriguing result:
Proposition 3.4. Assume that ®<cL¡c
cH , and consider the sealed-bid auction
where the bidder with the lowest bid obtains the patent and pays the next
higher bid. The strategy pro…le where, 8i; bi(ci)=( 1¡ ®)ci ¡ c constitutes an
equilibrium21, and the auction is e¢cient.
21The equilibrium is not in dominant strategies. Nevertheless, the equilibrium does not depend
12Proof. Assume that all bidders besides …rm j use the above strategy. Assume
…rst that j =a r gm i n i ci . Then, by bidding (1¡®)cj ¡c; j gets the patent, pays
(1 ¡ ®)min i6=j(ci) ¡ c; produces with cost ®cj + c and charges mini6=j(ci): This
yields for j ap a y o ¤o f
min
i6=j
(ci) ¡ (®cj + c) ¡ ((1 ¡ ®)min
i6=j
(ci) ¡ c)=®(min
i6=j
(ci) ¡ cj) > 0
It is clear that j cannot improve her payo¤ by bidding less. If j bids more,
then either the outcome does not change, or j looses the patent, yielding utility
of zero.
Assume now that j 6=a r gm i n i ci. Then, by bidding (1¡®)cj¡c; …rm j does not
win, and has a payo¤ of zero. Obviously, j cannot improve her payo¤ by bidding
more. In order to change the outcome, j must bid b · (1 ¡ ®)min i6=j ci ¡ c: In
that case, j gets the patent, pays (1¡®)min i6=j ci¡c, produces with cost ®cj +c;
and charges mini6=j ci: This yields a payo¤ of
min
i6=j
ci ¡ (®cj + c) ¡ ((1 ¡ ®)min
i6=j
ci ¡ c)=®(min
i6=j
ci ¡ cj) · 0
Hence bidding (1 ¡ ®)cj ¡ c is also optimal in this case.
Because equilibrium strategies are increasing and because the patent goes to
the lowest bidder, the …rm with the ex-ante lowest cost gets the patent, as required.
Q.E.D.
Since in our model marginal costs are drawn independently of each other, the
above result, together with revenue equivalence, can be used to compute equilibria
of other e¢cient mechanisms such as the one where the lowest bidder gets the
patent, but pays her own bid, etc... An e¢cient procedure with open bids is the
one where a price-clock goes down till a unique …rm remains active. That …rm
wins the patent and pays the price where clock stopped.
on the function governing the distribution of costs.
13For the case where ® =0we can also compare the seller’s expected revenue
in the e¢cient auction with her expected revenue in the standard auctions. Since
the respective physical allocations are very di¤erent, the result is not immediate.
Proposition 3.5. The seller’s revenue in the e¢cient auction is higher than the
expected revenue in standard auctions.
Proof. Denote by Ek
l the expectation of the k¡th order statistic out of l identi-
cal and independently distributed random variables which govern the …rms’ cost
distributions. The seller’s expected revenue in the e¢cient auction22 is given by
E2
n ¡ c: The seller’s expected revenue in the pooling equilibrium of a standard
auction23 is given by E1
n¡1 ¡ c. The result follows by observing that E2
n >E 1
n¡1:
For the case n =2we can also consider the ine¢cient separating equilibrium of
Proposition 3.2, which yields an expected revenue of E1
2 ¡ c: Since E1
2 <E 2
2; the
result follows for this case as well. Q.E.D.
3.3. R&D Races
Another model that can be treated within our framework is that where several
…rms are engaged in a R&D race. Each …rm bears the cost of investment in R&D,
but only one of them succeeds to get a patent on a cost reducing innovation.
In real life settings, some random process usually in‡uences the identity of the
innovator (besides the …rms’ characteristics, and the respective amounts spent on
R&D). If the in‡uence of this random process is strong enough, one should expect
some variation with regard to the innovator’s identity, and theoretical predictions
may be problematic. But even if one simply assumes that the …rm spending the
22Recall that each …rm i bids bi(ci)=( 1¡®)ci¡c; and the lowest bidder pays the next higher
bid.
23Recall that each …rm i bids b¤ = E[minj6=i cj ¡ c]:
14largest amount on R&D gets to innovate, our model predicts that variation will
occur. Indeed, such a situation is isomorphic to a …rst-price sealed-bid all pay
auction in which every agent submits and pays a bid for the item being sold,
while only the highest bidder receives the item.
By an argument which is completely analogous to the one in Proposition 3.1, in
equilibrium the innovator cannot always be the ex-ante most e¢cient …rm. For the
special case where ® =0 ; the strategy pro…le where bi(ci)=b¤ = 1
nE[minj6=i cj¡c]
constitutes an ine¢cient pooling equilibrium. The argument is analogous to the
one in Proposition 3.324. Thus, even without a random element it is impossible
to make a determinate prediction about the identity of the …rm that will emerge
as winner of the R&D race: all …rms spend the same amount, independently of
their ex-ante productivity.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have studied competition over a patent whose acquisition allows a decrease in
production cost. We have shown that, in general, standard auction mechanisms
are ine¢cient under conditions of incomplete information. Our result was ob-
tained in a model25 that abstracted from the possibility that bids at the auction
may serve as signalling devices. Our analysis also illustrates how a model with
interdependent valuations naturally appears in a ”vertical relations” framework.
It is of interest to analyze the impact of incomplete information in other such
24If we interpret this as an all-pay auction organized by a patent holder, note how revenue
equivalence holds among the present procedure and the second-price (or …rst-price) auction.
25One can extend the model in order to allow for an elastic demand function (for example
by introducing some form of imperfect substitutability among the …rms’ products). Besides the
issues discussed in this paper, existence of e¢cient auction equilibria in such models will also
depend on whether the …rms’ actions are strategic complements or substitutes.
15settings.
Takeover contests involve several features discussed here. Our model is appro-
priate for horizontal takeover battles where the bidders in the takeover contest
come from the same industry. Such takeovers are often motivated by the hope
to exploit existing synergies in order to reduce costs. (Jensen and Ruback, 1983;
Bradley, Desai and Kim 1983, 1988). Around 30% of the 236 contests contained
in the data-base of Bradley et.al. (1988) involve several bidders. Besides the rela-
tively intuitive result that target shareholders earn greater returns from multiple
bidder contests than from single-bidder o¤ers, Bradley et.al. show that target
stockholders capture the lion’s share of the gains from tender o¤ers, and that the
average winner’s gain in multiple-bidder contests is not signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero. This agrees well with the …ndings in our model.
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